Italian troops, Russian Africa Corps operators and Nigerien forces now share the same dusty perimeter around Base 101, a strategic site sitting beside an international runway and near thousands of tonnes of confiscated uranium concentrate. Their presence captures a global shift as Western influence retreats from the Sahel and Moscow quietly fills the vacuum.
A European outpost surrounded by new partners
Base 101 lies next to Diori-Hamani International Airport in Niamey, capital of Niger. On satellite images, it looks routine: hangars, aprons, fuel tanks, the usual sprawl of a military compound tied to an airport. On the ground, the picture is far stranger.
Several hundred Italian soldiers, deployed under the Bilateral Support Mission to the Republic of Niger, hold what has become the last significant Western foothold in the country. French, US and most German troops have already gone, pushed out by the 2023 coup and a sharp break with traditional partners.
Yet the Italians are still there, operating in a space now shared with Nigerien units and the Africa Corps, the new expeditionary structure tied to Russia’s defence ministry and widely seen as the successor to the Wagner network in Africa.
Base 101 has turned into a rare, almost experimental arrangement: NATO soldiers and Russian forces working side by side with the same host regime, but not with each other.
After the coup, only Rome stayed
Until mid‑2023, Niger was a key outpost for Western counter-terrorism and surveillance in the Sahel. France ran major operations from the country after being forced out of Mali. The United States poured money and hardware into air bases used for drones and special forces. Germany contributed a smaller presence.
The military coup in Niamey changed the calculus. Under pressure from the new junta and a wave of anti-French sentiment, Paris withdrew. Washington followed after months of fraught negotiations. Berlin quietly pulled out roughly forty troops.
Italy took a different path. Keen to position itself as a less intrusive partner and worried about migration routes crossing the Sahel towards the Mediterranean, Rome opted to maintain its contingent, estimated at around 300 soldiers. Official communication on numbers has been vague, part diplomatic caution, part security practice.
Italy is now the only Western country with a visible military mission still tolerated by Niger’s junta, a status that gives Rome leverage but also risks.
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A jihadist attack tests the new balance
The strange coexistence at Base 101 moved into sharper focus on 30 January, when fighters linked to the Islamic State in the Sahel attacked the site. According to local and diplomatic sources, the assault damaged buildings and aircraft parked on the base.
Nigerien forces, backed by Russia’s Africa Corps operators, responded and pushed the attackers back. The Italian troops did not engage in the fighting, remaining confined to their sector of the compound.
This detail matters. It suggests a delicate, perhaps unwritten arrangement: Italians are there under a bilateral framework with Niger, but combat operations against jihadists around the capital are now largely handled by Nigerien and Russian units.
Days later, on 9 February, the Italian chief of defence staff, Luciano Portolano, flew to Niamey. Officially, his visit focused on evaluating the security of Italian personnel and the future of the mission. Unofficially, it underlined the political sensitivity of sharing a base with Russian forces just as NATO tensions with Moscow remain high over Ukraine.
Uranium barrels and geopolitical stakes
The setting around the base adds another layer of complexity. Near the military perimeter lie barrels reportedly containing around 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate, seized by Niger’s junta from the French nuclear firm Orano, formerly Areva.
That stockpile symbolises much of what is at stake in Niger:
- Control over strategic minerals that feed Europe’s nuclear power plants.
- Competition between Western and Russian influence in a resource-rich state.
- Domestic nationalist politics, with the junta keen to show it is reclaiming assets from foreign companies.
For Italy, the proximity of Russian operatives to such sensitive material is awkward, even if no transfer of control has been signalled. For Moscow, having personnel near Niger’s uranium adds weight to its broader bid to reshape energy and security ties on the continent.
What is Africa Corps, exactly?
Africa Corps is a relatively new label for Russia’s overseas deployments, particularly in Africa, following the formal disbanding of much of the Wagner structure. In practice, it blends regular Russian military staff, private contractors and local auxiliaries, operating under looser deniability than classic state-to-state missions.
In countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic, Russian operatives have offered regime protection, combat support and online propaganda in exchange for mining concessions, arms contracts and political influence.
In Niger, Africa Corps represents Moscow’s bet that the junta wants a harder security edge and fewer Western lectures on democracy and human rights.
Italy’s quiet gamble in the Sahel
Rome has long worried that state collapse and jihadist violence in the Sahel could push more people to risk the journey to the Mediterranean. While France often took the political heat for controversial counter-insurgency campaigns, Italian diplomats stressed partnership and training.
The Bilateral Support Mission to Niger was originally framed as a way to help local forces secure borders, fight traffickers and handle terrorism, without turning Italy into a front-line combatant. That logic still shapes the mission, but the environment has changed dramatically.
Now, Italian troops operate next to Russian personnel that the West accuses of human rights abuses in other theatres. Any incident on or near the base could quickly spill over into domestic debates in Rome and discussions within NATO and the EU.
Possible scenarios for Base 101
| Scenario | What it would mean |
|---|---|
| Orderly Italian withdrawal | Rome negotiates a staged exit, avoiding confrontation with the junta and Moscow but losing its last foothold in Niger. |
| Reduced but continued presence | Italy scales down, focuses on training and logistics, and tolerates awkward proximity with Russian forces. |
| Deeper Italian engagement | Unlikely but possible if Niamey seeks balance between partners, giving Italy a role in security planning alongside Russia. |
| Forced expulsion | A sharp political break that would further cement Russia’s monopoly on foreign military support in Niger. |
What this means for the wider Sahel
Niger’s new security alignment sits in a broader regional trend. Military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all pivoted away from long-standing Western partners. They have coordinated policies under the Alliance of Sahel States and cooled relations with ECOWAS, the West African regional bloc.
Russia has seized the opening, presenting itself as a pragmatic ally offering weapons, instructors and regime survival strategies. The United Arab Emirates and Turkey are also manoeuvring for influence, particularly through arms deals and infrastructure projects.
For Western governments, the puzzle is how to maintain some security cooperation in the Sahel without legitimising regimes that seized power by force. Italy’s decision to stay in Niamey, even as France and the US left, is being watched in other capitals as a test case: can a smaller, less confrontational European power hold on where bigger players were pushed out?
Key concepts: why this base matters
To understand the significance of Base 101, a few terms help frame the stakes:
- Strategic depth: Niger provides operational depth for operations across the Sahel and the wider Sahara, from Libya’s border to northern Nigeria.
- Counter-terrorism hub: Airstrips, drone facilities and intelligence-sharing centres in and around Niamey are crucial for tracking jihadist movements.
- Influence corridor: Control of Niger helps shape trade, migration and security routes stretching from West Africa towards Europe and the Middle East.
Each of these dimensions gives Base 101 value that goes far beyond its fences and runways. It also explains why neither Rome nor Moscow seems in a hurry to leave, despite the uncomfortable cohabitation.
Risks for Niger, Italy and Russia
For Niger’s junta, hosting both Italian and Russian military personnel brings short-term gains. It broadens security options, complicates sanctions and gives the regime international visibility. Yet it also carries risks of entanglement in rivalries it does not fully control.
For Italy, the mission could strengthen its diplomatic profile and give it a voice in any future negotiations on the Sahel. But a single deadly incident involving Italian troops, Russian contractors or local civilians could quickly erode domestic support and raise questions in Brussels and Washington.
Russia, too, walks a fine line. Africa Corps’ presence in Niger is part of a wider African expansion pursued at relatively low cost. If that presence is tied to abuses, failed operations or clashes with Western forces, the political gains might fade as quickly as they emerged.
The coexistence at Base 101 is less a stable arrangement than a moving snapshot of a region in flux, where alliances shift faster than concrete can be poured.
For now, Italian soldiers continue their routines under the Sahelian sun, Russians occupy their own compounds, and Nigerien commanders try to coordinate this crowded security ecosystem. How long that balance holds will shape not only the future of Niger, but the next chapter of the Sahel’s long and contested war for influence.
Originally posted 2026-03-04 23:28:49.